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Abstract 
Billions of pounds per year is spent on aid for poor students in HE systems around the world, yet there 
remains limited evidence on the causal effect of these payments, particularly on the intensive margin. 
This is an empirical challenge since student aid is correlated with characteristics which influence both 
college enrolment and achievement. We overcome these challenges by studying a unique form of non-
linear means tested financial aid which is unadvertised, varies substantially across institutions, and is 
subject to shifts in generosity across cohorts. Using student-level administrative data collected from 10 
English universities, we study the effects of aid receipt on college completion rates, annual course 
scores, and degree class, using fixed effects and instrumental variables methods. Our findings suggest 
that each £1,000 of financial aid awarded increases the chances of gaining a good degree by around 3 
percentage points, driven by completion of the final year and course scores. 
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1. Introduction
Student aid is widely used around the world as a tool to promote access to university and to support 
disadvantaged students through their studies.  England is no exception, where spending on student 
aid, in the form of government grants, subsidies on maintenance loans and university based 
financial aid reaches billions of pounds annually.1 
To date, the majority of student aid research has focused on its effects on the extensive margin, 
specifically focusing on university participation decisions (see Kane 1999, Dynarski, 2003; 2003, 
Seftor and Turner 2002, Nielsen et al., 2010). However, there is surprisingly little research 
estimating the causal effect of aid on student outcomes whilst in college (degree completion, annual 
course scores and final degree classification). A likely reason for this is that many aid programs will 
impact both the extensive and intensive margins simultaneously. This set of outcomes is particularly 
important since aid-eligible students may be more likely to drop out of college or perform poorly in 
exams (Bettinger, 2004). 
Yet, as is widely acknowledged in the literature (Dynarski, 2003) estimating the impact of 
student aid on educational attainment is an empirical challenge. There are three main issues at play. 
First, student aid tends to be correlated with many observable and unobservable factors that also 
affect an individuals’ educational attainment. Aid recipients are more likely to be from poor 
backgrounds – and poor students are also more likely to drop out of college or fail exams for 
reasons unrelated to receipt of aid. A second problem is that aid is often related to student ability, 
either through the institution attended (since more able students congregate at better universities, 
who may in turn provide more generous financial packages), or directly through merit based aid 
programmes. Finally, the prospect of aid receipt at a university may be correlated with a students’ 
1 In 2009/10, the UK government spend on was £1050m on maintenance grants, £722m on student fee loan subsidies 
and £610m on maintenance loan subsidies. Universities themselves spent £300m on bursaries. Sources: Student grant 
figures – Student Loans Company, Statistical First Release, 06/2009, Table 3. Maintenance loan and fee loan figures – 
DIUS Annual Report 2009, annex 1, Table 11. (This does not represent the amount of money lent to students, but the 
future cost of subsidising and writing off student loans issued in that year as well as management of the student loans 
stock). 
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likeliness to attend that particular college, making it difficult to separate the effects of aid receipt 
from enrolment effects.  
In this paper we study a particular form of student aid – the English higher education bursary 
scheme – which we argue has unique features which help to overcome these problems, and establish 
the causal impact of this element of financial aid on student performance at university.  
The English bursary scheme is different to other bursary schemes around the world, such as 
that in place in the US. The scheme is large-scale - around 44% of students receive a bursary, and 
over £300m is spent on bursaries every year2 - meaning that the amount received by students is 
actually relatively small, averaging around £860 per bursary holder per year. This money is used for 
living expenses rather than as partial payment of tuition fees, which are deferred and do not require 
repayment until the student has graduated and is earning over £21,000 per year.  
Bursaries were initially brought in in 2006, to allay fears that a significant increase in tuition 
fees (from £1,200 per year to £3,000 per year) would deter students from low income backgrounds 
from entering post-secondary education. The regulations on bursaries state that they are not merit 
based (scholarships), but solely determined by parental income. Moreover, it was mandated that 
universities spend a minimum of 10% of tuition fee income on bursaries.   
However, universities were provided with no guidance or research with how to allocate these 
funds. Rather, they were given complete independence in how much they gave out and to whom. 
The upshot is universities designed their schemes on a somewhat arbitrary basis, and there is 
substantial variation in bursary generosity across institutions, with bursary amounts in our sample 
varying between £300 and £4,000 per year. Moreover, there is a large degree of cross-cohort 
variation within institution over time as universities experimented with their schemes from year to 
year.  
                                                 
2 See OFFA (2015): Table 1e. Note that published figures do not provide a split of spending on bursaries and 
scholarships separately but it is widely known the bursary spending constitutes the vast majority of this spending. 
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This set up effectively solves the first of our key problems. Whilst poor students are more 
likely to receive financial aid under the English bursary scheme, the definition of a poor student, 
and how much they receive in bursary, varies across institution and within institution over time. In 
other words, whilst typically there would be no observable counterfactual to a poor student 
receiving aid (since all poor students receive aid), our data contain a range of counterfactuals at 
different levels of parental income. This is best illustrated by Figure 1. This shows average bursary 
paid over deciles of the parental income distribution of students that received bursary aid. Within 
each household income bracket, each point on the chart represents a university. As is evident, for 
students of similar income backgrounds, there is a substantial range of bursaries on offer. For 
example, students with parental incomes of less than £10,000 per year could receive as little as £350 
and as much as £2,800 per year depending on the university attended. 
A second concern is that aid can be related to student ability – itself driver of student outcomes 
– because high ability students attend certain institutions which may also offer higher bursaries. Our 
set up alleviates this issue by exploiting changes in the bursary schemes within universities over 
time. By way of example, Figure 2 shows how the bursary scheme of a single university changed 
between 2006 and 2011. During this time the maximum bursary that could be received increased 
from £3000 and then subsequently decreased to £1000, while the maximum parental income of 
eligible students increased from £15,000 to £25,000. Moreover the number of different levels of 
bursaries awarded and at this university decreased from three to two.3 Thereby including university 
fixed effects along with controls for subject studied and enrolment test scores, we are ostensibly 
accounting for student ability and using the variation within a university across cohorts.  
In our most preferred specification, we exploit the sharp changes in bursaries awarded for a 
small change in parental income within a university cohort. Again see Figure 2, which highlights 
                                                 
3 In practise, for the majority of institutions, students are subject to the bursary rules in place upon year of entry to the 
course, so that policy change occurring during the duration of their course do not affect them, only new entry students. 
However, for some institutions, policy rule changes affect all students regardless of entry year. 
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the discontinuities in bursary aid awarded within universities according to parental income. In this 
specification we include university-cohort fixed effects, whilst also accounting for up to a quadratic 
in parental income, entry test scores, a set of student characteristics and subject area studied. We 
also account for non-compliance by universities by instrumenting with the institutions’ bursary 
rules. Here, the impact of aid is identified through imposing a smooth relationship of outcomes with 
parental income coinciding with sharp changes in aid eligibility.  
A related issue concerns merit-based aid. Typically in other bursary schemes around the world, 
aid is more commonly awarded to students with higher entry test scores. Hence, we again might be 
concerned that students with high prior attainment also receive high amounts of aid. In this case our 
estimates of the effect of aid on student performance would be biased upwards. However the 
English scheme is non-merit based. So, conditional on parental income, bursary receipt is 
orthogonal to entry test scores. Moreover, as Figure 3 shows, whilst universities vary in quality, 
there is substantial overlap in entry test score requirements. This is driven by universities having 
different entry requirements for different subjects, particularly arising when a university has a 
strong reputation in a particular subject area. Hence, there is a high incidence of common support in 
test scores across institutions.     
Our estimates could still be biased if students select their institution based on its financial aid 
package, either in general, or knowing that they will eligible for certain amount of aid – the third of 
our identification problems. For example, students from poor backgrounds might choose a 
particular institution if doing so would mean they gain from a particularly generous aid package, 
and may also be more likely to graduate for unobservable reasons unrelated to the generosity of aid 
e.g. motivation. This would create an upward bias in our estimates. However, in our setting, 
students are unlikely to sort on parental income, conditional on entry test scores, because students 
have very little possibility of knowing what their bursary is likely to be ahead of enrolling in 
college. This arises in part because university bursary schemes are highly opaque, and in part 
because of the rather convoluted university application scheme in place in England. We argue that 
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the relatively unknown status of this program means that we are estimating the impact on the 
intensive margin only, rather than the program also changing the student composition.  
To explain in more depth, each university has its own unique bursary scheme in place. Bursary 
schemes are governed by complex means-testing rules, usually involving income thresholds and 
corresponding bursary amounts. Despite the generosity of such schemes they are rarely advertised 
in university prospectuses or included in aggregated university guides.4 So, to understand what 
bursary they are entitled to, a student would have to navigate the finance pages of each institution 
they are interested in, understand the bursary schedule in place, and calculate their corresponding 
entitlement. Evidence that English bursaries do not influence enrolment choices of students has 
been provided by Corver (2010) who looks at the impact of bursaries on application to university 
using detailed administrative data. His study found no link between the amount of bursary on offer 
and likeliness to enrol in that particular university.  
In addition to the lack of information, there is a large uncertainty at the time of application 
about which university they will eventually attend – and hence, which bursary they are going to 
receive. Students apply to university through the UCAS (Universities and Colleges Admissions 
Service) around nine months in advance. In the first stage of the application process, students make 
applications to up to 7 universities, with their application comprising of a personal statement and 
their predicted entry scores (generally A-level5 grades). They then receive offers from each of the 
universities they have applied to, in each case conditional on entry scores. At this point, the student 
must rank these offers in order of preference. Finally, once the student has received their entry 
scores, they are obliged to attend the highest ranked university for which they meet the entry score 
criteria. The upshot of all of this is that i) students cannot know ahead of time what bursary they 
                                                 
4 To remedy this situation, Murphy and Wyness have recently collated the complete set of financial bursary rules for 
English universities and hosted a simplified version on the Guardian newspaper website for perspective students’ use. 
This is available at http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/10/which-universities-offer-the-best-bursaries 
5 Entry requirements vary by institution but generally students are required to have a minimum of 2–3 A-levels (the 
academic qualification offered by educational institutions to students completing secondary or pre-university education) 
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will end up with, since they do not know which university they will end up attending until they 
receive their final grades, ii) controlling the amount of bursary received by gaming the system (e.g. 
by mis-reporting parental income) would be near impossible since parental income thresholds vary 
by university, so students would not know which threshold to game. Thus, the institution students 
attend is likely to be unrelated to their financial aid package, and is more likely to be driven by 
idiosyncratic preferences, conditional on entry scores. 
To examine the impact of bursary aid on college completion and degree performance we make 
use of a unique dataset collected from 10 higher education institutions in England. The dataset 
comprises individual-level data on UK and EU undergraduate students (i.e. those eligible for 
bursaries), comprising the institution and course attended, the bursary they are awarded each year 
(including zeros), their parental income and their college entry test scores, as well as basic 
demographics and background characteristics. These data also hold detailed information on their 
university performance, comprising their annual course scores, number of years of university 
completed, and their final degree classification. Such detailed data is largely unavailable in standard 
datasets.  
Our preferred within university-year results suggest that each £1,000 of financial aid that 
students are eligible for in the first year increases the chances of obtaining a good degree by 2.9 
percentage points. This is driven by both degree completion in the second and third year and higher 
course scores in the first and third year. For example, we find that at the mean each £1,000 of 
financial aid awarded in the first year increases the chances of completing the second year by 1.6 
percentage points, and the third year by 1.8 percentage points (somewhat smaller than the effects 
found by Bettinger, 2004) and increases test scores by 0.055 standard deviations in the first year and 
by 0.045 in the third year.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature relevant to this 
paper, while Section 3 outlines the features of the UK student aid system. Section 4 describes our 
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dataset. Section 5 goes on to outline the fixed effects and two stage least squares methodologies that 
will be employed, whilst Section 6 presents results and robustness checks. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
The majority of the research on the effects of financial aid are based in the US and focus on their 
impact on enrolment. In general, these studies have found a positive impact of easy to apply for aid 
programmes on enrolment. Dynarski (2000) finds that Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, a merit-aid 
programme, had a positive impact on students: a $1,000 increase in aid resulted in a 4 percentage 
point increase in HE participation. In a later paper (Dynarski, 2003) exploits a one-off policy 
change whereby financial aid was withdrawn from children with a deceased, disabled or retired 
father, finding that the reform reduced HE participation by 3.6 percentage points. Conversely, Kane 
(1995) looks at the impact of the Pell Grant aid system, finding no impact on participation, while 
Seftor and Turner (2002) find a small impact of Pell Grant eligibility of 0.7 percentage points per 
$1,000 of aid (although on a restricted sample of mature students).  
Studies from the UK and Europe are rarer, possibly due to the paucity of ‘clean’ policy breaks 
and lack of large-scale data. Nielsen et al. (2010) exploit a change in aid in the Danish HE system 
which particularly benefitted higher income students, and find that a $1,000 increase in grants 
results in a 1.35 percentage point increase in HE participation. In the UK, Dearden et al (2014) 
study the impact of a policy reform which re-introduced grant aid to students from poor families in 
England, and find an impact on participation of 3.95 percentage points per £1,000.  
A small number of papers from the US look at the impact of aid on both college enrolment 
and college completion or years of study. Turner and Bound (2002) focus on the impact of the G.I. 
Bill (which provided veterans of the Second World War funds for college education) on both 
college enrolment and completion, finding positive effects. Similarly Dynarski’s 2003 paper 
examining the impact of the withdrawal of social security benefits, finds an effect on college 
completion of about 0.16 years per $1,000. Sjoquist and Winters (2012) examine the effects of state 
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based merit-based aid programs on college attendance and completion, but find no evidence of a 
positive effect. 
Closer in nature to our paper are those studies which look purely at college attainment 
(conditional on entry).  There are a number of quasi-experimental papers which generally find 
financial aid to have negative impact on college drop-out and retention, and a positive impact on 
completion. These include Tuner and Bound, 2002;  Dynarski, 2003; Bettinger, 2004. Also relevant 
are studies by Goodman (2008), Oreopoulos et al. (2009), Scott-Clayton (2011), DesJardins and 
McCall (2010), Garibaldi et al. (2012), and Joensen (2013) who demonstrate the potential 
effectiveness of providing incentives related to merit and timing in financial aid packages. 
 
3. Institutional setup 
The UK higher education system is characterised by high tuition fees (in 2012 they increased from 
£3,300 to £9,0006 per year, meaning they are now the highest in Europe and on a par with many US 
institutions7) but a generous national system of financial support. This consists of means-tested fee 
and maintenance loans (the latter of up to £5,740 per year in 20158), both repayable after graduation 
once the graduate is in employment and earning above £21,000 per year, and non-repayable means-
tested maintenance grants of up to £3,387 per year for students with parental incomes less than 
£25,000. 
 However, maintenance grants will be abolished from September 2016 (with maintenance 
loans increased to make up the difference9), meaning higher education bursaries – the form of aid 
                                                 
6 All figures expressed in this section are in nominal prices 
7 Whilst tuition fees are decided at the institution level, in practise the vast majority of universities charge the full 
£9,000 per year, and the average fee stood at £8,830 in 2015 (See OFFA (2015): Table 2) 
8 For full-time undergraduates living away from home and studying at English universities outside London. Different 
rates apply for those living at home or studying in London. See https://www.gov.uk/student-finance/loans-and-grants 
for full details. 
9 See http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/7905 for more details 
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studied in this paper – will become the sole non-repayable form of student financial aid.10 Bursaries 
also represent the sole form of aid which is governed at an institutional rather than a national level, 
giving rise to significant variation in eligibility across institutions, unlike the other national forms of 
aid. 
 As described in the introduction, the system of higher education bursaries was introduced by 
the UK government in 2006. This coincided with the replacement of upfront means-tested tuition 
fees of £1,200 per year with a deferred tuition fee of up to £3,000 per year11 backed by a tuition fee 
loan. As part of these changes English institutions were required to offer a bursary to all 
disadvantaged students (defined as those in receipt of a full maintenance grant, £2,700 at that time; 
note there are no other requirements, such as prior academic attainment or academic performance 
whilst at university, though the student has to be registered each year to receive their bursary). The 
minimum bursary that institutions could offer was set to be the difference between full fee charged 
and the maintenance grant received by the student. Thus, the minimum bursary at the time was £300 
per year (£3,000 in fees minus £2,700 grants).  From 2010 onwards, the rules were redefined so that 
the minimum bursary became 10% of fee charged. Since fees at the time were around £3,200 per 
year, the minimum bursary remained around £320 per year.12 In practise, the bursary offered across 
institutions has varied considerably. 
 A notable feature of the bursaries system concerns their delivery. Although each individual 
institution designs its own bursary scheme (including the income thresholds for bursary receipt and 
the amount of bursary on offer), the Student Loans Company (SLC) administers the bursary 
                                                 
10 There are other forms of non-repayable aid – mainly merit based scholarships and hardship funds, but these are 
generally restricted to a small number of students per institution; to the author’s knowledge, no published data exist on 
the total value of these 
11 Again the tuition fee was intended to be decided at institution level but in practise, all institutions charged £3,000 per 
year 
12 Since 2012, no minimum bursary requirement has been in place. The bursary system was supplanted by the National 
Scholarship Programme (NSP) in which universities were allocated a set amount of money to distribute among their 
disadvantaged students in the form of bursaries, fee waivers or other benefits. The NSP has since been disbanded.  
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payment for the majority of schemes.13 The procedure for the first year of entry and every 
subsequent year a student attends university is as follows:14 
i. Upon application to university (and each subsequent year) students complete a student finance 
form in order to apply for the national system of tuition fee loans, maintenance loans and 
maintenance grants. The latter two elements of the system are means tested, thus students must 
divulge their parental income. They also have to consent for this information to be shared with 
their institution (of which 98% do).  
ii. The SLC then verify the students’ parental income with the help of HMRC (the department of 
the UK Government responsible for the collection of taxes, the payment of some forms of state 
support, and the administration of other regulatory regimes including the national minimum 
wage).  
iii. The university supplies the SLC with the bursary eligibility rules it has chosen for that year. The 
SLC thus calculate bursary due to every student based on their parental income.   
iv. The SLC inform the university of which students will receive a bursary and how much they 
should be paid. The university then has to decide whether to approve, modify or cancel a 
student’s bursary. The vast majority of bursaries are approved (some 98%). Students who do not 
take up their place, or who drop out of study before the bursary payment is due will not be 
approved for payment. Occasionally, modifications are made, such as if a student switches 
institutions, or their income changes. 
v. Prior to their arrival at university that year, the SLC send every eligible student a letter which 
appears to be from the university informing them that they are eligible for a bursary, and the 
amount they are eligible for.  
                                                 
13 Universities can opt to administer their own scheme but the majority choose to do so through the SLC 
14 The information that follows was provided to the author by the Student Loans Company in conversation – therefore 
no citations are available 
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vi. Finally, the SLC makes the payment to the student which is debited from the institutions’ 
account. This payment occurs in the same transaction as the awarding of the student loan. This 
may have the impact of decreasing the salience of this form of student support. 
 A number of pertinent issues arise from this process. First, note that students do not have to 
apply for bursaries in order to receive them. Thus, there is no possibility of a student choosing not 
to take up their bursary (or forgetting to do so). As long as the student has applied for other forms of 
student support through the SLC (which include the £9,000 annual fee loan)15 and choose to declare 
their parents’ income, and are eligible for a bursary, they will receive it.  The implication is that we 
will not have an issue with non-compliance on the part of the students, and our parameters do not 
represent intention to treat, as is common in financial aid literature (Dynarski, 2008, Dearden et al, 
2012), but actually represent the impact of bursary aid receipt on outcomes.  
However, despite this strict institutional setup, we do observe a degree of non-compliance in 
our data. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which plots household income and bursary receipt for every 
student within one particular university cohort in our sample. The horizontal and vertical lines show 
the different bursary levels stated by the university at each parental income level.  As can be seen in 
this figure, the vast majority of students receive the bursary amount that corresponds with their 
observed household income. However in a small but significant number of cases, students receive 
more or less than they are entitled to. Across all our universities, we observe varying rates of non-
compliance, with the average of around 5% of students receiving a bursary that is “too high” and 
around 7% receiving a bursary that is “too low”.  
One concern is that these issues are not simply random measurement error, but are arising from 
systematic issues that could generate biases. Administrators at these universities stated three 
situations where the amount of bursary received does not equal that which should be received for 
that level of parental income. First, a reassessment of parental income indicated that the student 
                                                 
15 In 2011, 88% of eligible students took up maintenance loans (see www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn01079.pfd) 
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would be eligible for a different student aid amount (either due to student error, or a sudden change 
in circumstances). Hence, the actual bursary paid by the institution differed from that expected 
according to their parental income records. Assuming that the measurement error may have 
overstated or understated parental income, this would downward bias the estimates. The second 
type of non-compliance concerns student pre-dropout. If students register for a course, but then 
withdraw from the course before arrival, they will not receive a bursary but may still be recorded in 
the administrative records. Typically, such students would have been removed from the data, but it 
is possible that could still appear in our data as having dropped out in year one. The result would be 
to bias our estimates upward. 
The final example of non-compliance concerns the university using its discretion to award 
additional funds to some students. If it is the case that institutions are systematically awarding high 
ability students more than they are entitled to, this will again bias our estimates upwards.16 In order 
to eliminate the biases caused by this non-compliance, we adopt an instrumental variables (IV) 
methodology for our preferred specification. This two-stage least squares approach, where the 
amount of grant aid an individual receives is predicted using the bursary rules set out by the 
institutions themselves, will provide an unbiased estimate of the local average treatment effect 
(LATE). Hence the 2SLS estimates will be based on the compliers only.  
 A further important implication of our institutional setup is that take-up of bursary each year 
is not endogenously related to eligibility in the previous year. For example, it may be the case that 
students who receive large bursaries in first year (and who may also be more likely to be low 
income) may be more likely to take up their bursaries the next year (and vice versa). As take-up is 
not governed by the students’ wishes, our results do not suffer from this bias.   
 
                                                 
16 Despite students’ prior test scores being uncorrelated with indicators of whether the students received above or below 
their designated amount, one my still be concerned that those receiving more may have other unobservable positive 
abilities.  
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4. Data 
This paper makes use of a unique administrative dataset collected from 10 UK universities. The 
data comprise the entire undergraduate population of UK and EU students for up to 6 cohorts of 
students beginning their studies between 2006 and 2011.  
We begin with a sample of 325,418 students. As our estimation strategy relies on using the 
variation in financial aid for a given level of entry test scores to estimate the effect of bursaries on 
student outcomes, we first discard those students for whom we have no knowledge of parental 
income. As stated in Section 3, we only hold parental income information for students who received 
a bursary at some point. This means our sample consists only of bursary holders.  
This reduces our sample substantially, to 63,719 students. We then discard those of non-
traditional age, retaining only students aged 21 or below upon starting university. We also discard 
those students undertaking vocational courses or those above or below degree level. This leaves 
34,026 students in the sample. Our sample is truncated, meaning we observe some students all the 
way through their studies (3 years), whilst we can only observe the first or second year of some 
students, since they would not have had the chance to complete their degrees at the time we 
obtained the data. Thus, in our preferred specifications, we use only the non-truncated sample of 
students, for whom we are able to observe their full transition through college, including dropouts. 
This is a total of 23,093 students. In a robustness check, looking only at completion in years 1 and 
2, we include students for whom we only observe part of their transition through college – i.e. the 
full sample of 34,026 students. 
 
University and course data 
In each case our data contains information on the university attended (though for the purposes of 
this study, this is anonymised) and the subject studied. In the latter case data on some 2,200 courses 
was initially received. In the interests of simplicity, this was reduced to 22 different course types 
based on the widely-used JACS classifications See Appendix A).  
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Bursary/finance data 
As described above, bursaries are administered through the Student Loans Company, then details of 
the bursaries paid out are returned to the university. The result is that the dataset contains full 
information on the bursary each student received each year, but parental income data only for those 
students in receipt of a bursary (since the Student Loans Company only returns data on those who 
were deemed eligible for a bursary).  
Background information  
The dataset holds information on the student background characteristics, such as their parental 
occupation, parental socio-economic status, their age at the point of entry, ethnic group, gender, 
disability status. Crucially, the dataset also contains information on the students’ entry 
qualifications, in terms of their qualification types, subjects and grades. Again there were many 
hundreds of qualification types among the dataset. For simplicity we have therefore augmented the 
dataset with the corresponding UCAS (University and College Admissions Service) points assigned 
to this particular qualification. UCAS points scoring is the system used for students to meet the 
entry requirements for university admissions. All UK qualifications are awarded UCAS points, with 
the most common being A-Levels taken at the end of secondary school, which has a maximum 
points value of 140.  Universities typically have entry requirements based on the best three A-Level 
equivalent scores. We calculated this corresponding score for each student.  
Outcomes 
The dataset tracks students throughout the course of their degree. Therefore we have information on 
each student’s final outcome, including whether they dropped out, and their year of drop out, their 
annual course scores (generally this was provided as an annual average of all courses taken rather 
than individual scores per course. Since these scores are not comparable across universities, or 
individuals – since students take different courses – we standardize these to have a mean of zero 
and a standard deviation of 1), and their final degree classification. 
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In Table 1 we present some descriptive statistics on the individuals in our sample. The average 
bursary per bursary holder is £71217, though there is variation over year of study. 43% of the 
sample are male, whilst the average age is 18.6 and 79.9% are white. According to the most recent 
Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) statistics (HESA, 2015: Table 6a), 45% of full-time 
undergraduates are male, 61% are under 22, and 60% are white. Therefore, our sample is 
representative in terms of gender, but is younger and whiter than the UK undergraduate population, 
which is expected given our sample restrictions. Students receive on average £1,800 per year in 
non-repayable grant aid from the government. This implies the average bursary received among our 
sample of students is substantial, representing an additional 40% on grant aid.  
The university completion rate is almost 87% meaning that only 13% of students fail to 
complete university. This is compatible with the dropout rate from UK official statistics, of around 
8% (HEFCE, 2014) bearing in mind our stricter (of traditional age, degree students) and poorer 
(bursary holder) sample. Drop out is highest in first year, at over 7%, and steadily declines.  62.6% 
of the entire sample obtain a good degree, defined here as a first or upper second class degree. Of 
those who complete their studies without dropping out, 72% obtain a good degree.  
 
5. Estimation strategy  
Estimating the impact of financial aid on student outcomes is typically fraught with issues due to 
the amount of aid received being highly correlated with factors that also impact on outcomes e.g. 
parental income and student ability. The institutional setting of the English bursary schemes allows 
us to disentangle these effects. We use three progressively more specific sources of variation in 
financial aid awarded to estimate the casual impact of aid on outcomes. Additionally, we instrument 
our financial aid awarded with aid eligibility to eliminate bias caused by non-compliance in the 
data. 
                                                 
17 All prices are henceforth expressed in 2013 prices (RPI) 
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First, we exploit the variation in generosity in bursary awarded between institutions. 
Conditioning on parental income, this compares students from a given parental income background 
but receiving different amounts of aid dependent upon which university they attend (see Figure 1). 
We allow for non-linearities in the impact of amount awarded and parental income by including a 
squared term for each. To this basic specification we add a set of student characteristics, including 
entry qualification scores, and allow for differences in student outcomes across departments by 
including a set of indicators for each of the 22 subject areas. Effectively, we are comparing students 
with the same parental income, prior test scores and studying the same subject, but who are 
attending different universities due to idiosyncratic preferences. However, one should be concerned 
that even after controlling for these characteristics, student that attend high bursary institutions may 
attain better outcomes because these institutions are more ‘productive’.  
To account for this, the second source of variation we use is within university over time, 
through including university fixed effects. Since the enforced introduction of bursaries in 2006, 
there have been a considerable number of changes to bursary schemes within institutions (see 
Figure 2). We therefore exploit the variation in bursary awards within institution over time, 
effectively comparing two individuals of the same parental income background, but receiving 
different bursary awards due to their university entry year. Given the opaque nature of the student 
aid system for students applying to university it is unlikely that students delay or bring forward their 
enrolment at a specific institution in response to changes in bursary schemes. 
The third source of variation is the most restrictive, exploiting the non-linear nature of the 
bursary schemes within an institution entry cohort, by including university-cohort fixed effects. All 
students entering a university in a given year are awarded financial aid based on the same set of 
rules relating to parental income. However due to the stepped nature of these schemes there are 
sharp discontinuities in the amount awarded for only small changes in parental income. For 
example, in Figure 2 we can see an individual with parental income of £15,000 in 2006 would have 
received a bursary of £3,000, but an individual with parental income of only £1 more would receive 
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a bursary of £1,545. We only allow for the impact of parental income to change smoothly through 
the use of a quadratic term, and for the relationship between income and outcomes to be constant 
across all universities. The non-linearities in the means tested bursaries at universities over time at 
different points of parental income provide us with variation to identify the impact of aid on student 
outcomes. 
As discussed in Section 3, we are concerned that our results may suffer from biases caused by non-
compliance, which could bias our estimates upwards or downwards. To account for this, we adopt an 
instrumental variables approach. The estimation consists of two-stage least squares instrumenting the 
grant amount awarded using the amount of aid the student is eligible for, according to the 
university’s own rules (bearing in mind their parental income and year of university entry). In the 
first stage, the size of the aid coefficient therefore represents the average increase in aid the student 
is eligible for, rather than that awarded. The second stage estimates the relationship between 
students’ aid eligibility and the outcome of interest. Specifically we use the following equations:  
 
𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (2) 
 
where y is the outcome of student i attending university u, who started in year of entry cohort c . A 
is a continuous variable representing the amount of financial aid received by student i in thousands 
of pounds.  Parental income Inc which the determinant of aid awarded is accounted for with a 
quadratic function. The instrument Z represents the amount of aid the student is eligible for, rather 
than the amount actually awarded, as discussed. The detailed nature of the data also allow us to 
condition on a large vector of background characteristics of all undergraduates in the study (X), 
such as university entry grades, age, ethnicity and gender. Included with these we additionally 
control for the national student financial aid award (which is means tested but differs from bursaries 
since it is awarded at the national rather than institutional level, hence has no across university 
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variation, and means tested gradually so does not feature multiple discontinuities).18 As described, 
we account for average differences across subjects (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖). Finally we include a set of university-year 
effects (𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), which  will provide us with the parameters of interest 𝛽𝛽1, and 𝛽𝛽2 which will provide  
the impact of an additional £1000 of financial aid on student outcome y at different levels of aid.19 
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Main results 
We begin the analysis by building up the specification from a raw correlation to our preferred 
specification, which uses the variation in aid within university cohorts. Table 2 presents estimates of 
having an additional £1,000 of bursary awarded in the first year on the probability of eventually 
gaining a good degree, assuming a linear probability model. The outcome variable is defined as 
equal to one if the student gains a first class honours degree or upper second and zero if the student 
obtains a lower second, third class honours degree, or if they drop out of university before 
completion. This uses the sample of students that could have completed their degree (i.e. excluding 
those students for whom we can only observe first or first and second years of study). 
Panel A shows estimates of the impact assuming constant returns to financial aid, Panel B 
allows for decreasing marginal returns by adding a quadratic term in aid. Column 1 contains the raw 
correlation: an additional £1,000 of aid is associated with a 2.5 percentage point increase in 
students’ chances of graduating with a good degree.  There will be both positive and negative biases 
at play here. On the one hand, students from low income households are more likely to receive 
more financial aid, and are also less likely to achieve a good degree, generating a negative bias. On 
the other hand, students with high ability are likely to perform well at university, and are also more 
                                                 
18 Excluding the national grant scheme in the set of student characteristics does not significantly alter any of the results.  
19 All standard errors presented are robust and clustered at the university level. 
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likely to attend prestigious richer institutions, which can afford to give out bigger bursaries; these 
factors would generate positive biases.  
In column 2 we address the first of these issues by controlling for up to a quadratic in 
parental income, and also allowing for the effect of bursaries to change non-linearly with the 
amount awarded.20 As expected, this raises the coefficient (since poorer students, who tend to have 
worse outcomes receive bigger bursaries). The linear estimate from Panel A shows for every £1000 
students are 10% more likely to obtain a ‘good degree’. The corresponding estimates allowing for 
decreasing returns are found below in Panel B. For ease of interpretation, beneath the estimated 
parameters for 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 and 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 (aid and aid squared) we present the marginal impact of £1000 of aid at 
the mean level of year 1 bursary aid (£862). Here the marginal impact of aid increases the 
likelihood of a student obtaining a good degree by 13.0 percentage points and is significant at 1%. 
The remainder of the results section will refer only to Panel B as the quadratic term is always 
significant and the marginal effect at mean follows the same pattern as the linear effects. 
Students with higher prior test scores are likely to achieve good outcomes regardless and to 
the extent that they also attend institutions which give out larger bursaries, not controlling for them 
would bias up the estimate. In column 3 we additionally control for student characteristics (test 
scores, age, gender, ethnicity) which reduces the marginal impact to 0.115.  
In column 4 we account for any differences across universities by including university fixed 
effects. The impact at the mean holds stable. Column 5 adds year effects accounting for any general 
increase in the probability of achieving a good degree over time, which significantly reduces the 
impact of aid to 0.101. The final column replaces the university and year effects with a set of 
indicators for each year university combination. This exploits the non-linear relationship between 
                                                 
20 Including university-cohort fixed effects before parental income reduces the positive bias, with the marginal 
impact of aid being 0.006, and remains insignificant. 
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aid awarded and parental income. This shows that a £1,000 increase in bursary aid at the mean 
increases the probability of gaining a good degree by 8.4 percentage points.  
This coefficient is comparable to the work of Bettinger (2004), bearing in mind exchange 
rates and inflation, who finds that a $1,000 (£660 aprox) increase in Pell aid corresponds to a 4 
percent reduction in the likelihood that students withdraw from college in first year. However, as 
discussed we believe there are significant biases at play in these estimates, caused by non-
compliance due to parental income reassessment, student pre-dropout, and through universities 
using discretionary payments. To remove these sources of bias we adopt a 2SLS approach, where in 
the first stage we predict students’ aid awarded according to the aid that they were actually eligible 
for according to their parental income and university rules in their year of entry. The In the second 
stage we estimate the intention to treat effect, using this eligible aid amount as the instrument. The 
results for are contained in Table 3. Panel A recreates the results from Table 2, for reference. Panel 
B, meanwhile presents the reduced form results (i.e. regressing bursary rules on probability of 
obtaining a good degree) and the IV estimates. In each case the marginal effects at mean level of 
bursary are presented. As the results show, the coefficient arising from the instrumental variables 
estimators is significantly lower than that of the fixed effects; the coefficient on bursary aid drops 
from 8.4 to 2.9 percentage points. Note that the reduced form estimates show a very similar 
estimate of the impact of aid eligibility on degree performance of 2.3 percentage points. This is 
perhaps unsurprising, given that there is only a small degree of non-compliance in our data. 
Nevertheless, the difference in our fixed effects and IV estimators is of a significant degree for us to 
be concerned that there is a degree of bias caused by non-compliance in our data. Therefore the IV 
estimator is our preferred specification; we find a £1000 increase in bursary aid increases students’ 
likeliness of obtaining a good degree by 2.9 percentage points.  
 What could be driving this increase in the chances of getting a good degree? We explore this 
in tables 4-5 by looking at the impact on completion of each academic year and annual course 
scores. All effects presented in these tables are the marginal impacts at the mean and are obtained 
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from separate regressions.  Table 4 first shows the impact of an additional £1,000 bursary award in 
first year on degree completion in the current and subsequent years. In each case, the full set of 
controls and a quadratic in bursaries is used, and we present the fixed effects, reduced form and IV 
results. 
For our preferred IV estimator, we find some evidence that bursary aid has a positive impact 
on completion. We find a £1,000 increase in aid improves students’ likeliness to complete their 
second year by 1.8 percentage points, and their third (final) year by 1.8 percentage points – though 
we find no effect for the concurrent year. It is interesting that the impact of aid on completion of 
final year is slightly lower than the impact of aid on obtaining a good degree – suggesting there may 
be some additional impact of aid coming through course scores.  
This is examined more fully in Table 5, in which we present the results for an additional 
£1,000 of bursary on mean standardised course scores each year.  Here we see a largely positive 
impact of bursaries – with the IV estimator showing an additional £1,000 of bursaries in the first 
year generating a 0.055 standard deviation increase in course scores in that year, and a 0.045 
standard deviation in course scores in the third year. Thus, as hypothesised above, we do see a 
positive effect of bursary in year 1 on course scores in year 3. 
In summary, our analysis shows a positive impact of bursary aid on degree performance, to 
the tune of 2.9 percentage points per £1,000. This positive impact appears to be driven by both an 
increased probability of completion (of as much as 1.8 percentage points) and improvements in test 
scores (of as much as 0.055 standard deviations). These impacts are relatively small (and smaller 
than those obtained by Bettinger (2009)). Around 62% of students in our sample currently obtain a 
good degree, whilst 86% complete their degrees.  
 
6.2 Robustness Checks 
We perform a series of robustness checks on our IV estimates to determine their stability. 
These are shown in Table 6. The first row presents the marginal effects of aid in the first year of 
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study at the mean for both the fixed effects and IV models, with the outcome varying across the 
columns. The outcomes are complete the 1st year, standardised 1st year course scores, and obtain 
good degree in columns one, two and three respectively. 
Our main specification only uses students who could have potentially completed their 
course. However, we have data on all students that are currently studying at these ten universities. 
Therefore the second panel shows estimates includes additional cohorts, including all current 
students (i.e. those for whom we can only observe to the end of first or second year), this increases 
the sample size by around 10,000. Reassuringly the estimates do not change significantly for 
completing the 1st year or 1st year test scores. We do not present estimates for Good Degree as they 
would be the same as the row above.  
One of the arguments that we put forward is that comparisons can be made across 
universities, which we support by showing that there is common support in the entry test scores of 
students (See Figure 3). Three universities appear to be exceptions to this, university one has test 
scores mostly below that of the others, and universities nine and ten appear to only enrol high 
ability students. Therefore in the third panel we re-estimate the results excluding these universities. 
Again this appears to have very little effect on the results.  
Finally one may be concerned that the measure of prior ability that we condition on is also 
influenced by parental income. This would be a problem if students from low income backgrounds 
achieved lower test scores for a given ability compared to students from a high income background. 
This means when controlling for entry test scores we would effectively be comparing higher ability 
students from low income backgrounds to lower ability students from higher income backgrounds. 
To account for this potential issue we include an additional term where test scores are multiplied by 
log(1/(Income+1)). Once again this appears to have little impact on the estimate impact of financial 
aid on student outcomes.  
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6.3 Heterogeneity of aid impact 
So far, we have shown that bursary aid improves students’ degree performance by reducing dropout 
and improving test scores. In this section we explore whether certain students may benefit from 
bursaries more than others. Note that the results presented in this section are derived from the fixed 
effects estimations in Section 5. 
 In Figure 5 we plot the impact of bursary aid on degree performance across a range of 
bursary amounts. This figure is a graphical representation of the results presented in column 6 of 
Table 2, for a range of bursary amounts. Increasing aid improves performance, although there are 
decreasing marginal returns. The impact of aid peaks at £1,600 – where aid above this point in fact 
proves to worsen student outcomes, although not significantly. 
 Up to now, we have assumed that bursary aid has the same impact for all students. But of 
course it may be the case that some students benefit more from bursaries than others. To explore 
this we include additional terms allowing for the effect of aid to vary by parental income. We find 
no effects of varying the aid in this way (not shown). However,  we examine the effect of bursaries 
across student ability levels (as proxied by entry test scores). A common argument in the literature 
(Dynarksi, 2003; Guryan, 2004) is that providing aid to marginal students may be inefficient. For 
example, if it was found that aid had the most impact on low ability students completing the first 
year of university, and negligible impacts on high ability students, one could argue that aid is 
simply subsidising marginal students. This would be problematic if such students derive less benefit 
from their studies, for example by experiencing lower returns to their degrees (Tobias, 2000). 
Alternatively, if high ability students gained the most from bursaries, regardless of income, then 
bursaries would be relieving the liquidity constraints of high ability students, allowing them to gain 
more from university. This would be an argument in favour of merit based financial aid. Through 
interacting the prior test scores with aid awarded, Figure 6 presents the marginal impact of aid over 
different entry test scores. Despite the wide confidence intervals, this is indicative evidence that 
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bursary aid has a constant impact across all ability levels and implies that a means tested aid 
program is efficient.  
 
7 Conclusion 
Financial barriers to higher education have the potential to exacerbate existing earning inequalities. 
Our findings suggest that higher levels of bursary aid improve student performance. Students who 
have been awarded a bursary increase their likelihood of gaining a good degree by 2.9 percentage 
points for each additional £1,000 awarded. The effect is driven by both improvements in test scores 
and completion rates. Our results are robust to different specifications and samples. 
 The institutional set up we study means that we can also examine heterogeneity in our 
effects.  Increasing aid improves performance, but we find some evidence of decreasing marginal 
returns to aid at higher levels. We also find that the returns to aid are constant across ability levels.   
  
 26 
References 
Bettinger, E (2004) ‘How Financial Aid Affects Persistence’, NBER Working Paper 10242, 
National Bureau of Economic Research  
 
Bound, J. & S. Turner, (2002). Going to War and Going to College: Did WorldWar II and the G.I. 
Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans? Journal of Labor Economics. 20(4): 
784-815. 
 
Card, D., Lee, D., Pei, Z., & A. Weber, (2012), ‘Nonlinear Policy Rules and the Identification and 
Estimation of Causal Effects in a Generalized Regression Kink Design’, NBER Working Paper 
18565, National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Corver, M., (2010) ‘Have bursaries influenced choices between universities?’, Research Paper 
2010/06, Office for Fair Access, UK 
 
Cerqua, A., & Pellegrini, G., (2014), ‘Do subsidies to private capital boost firms' growth? A 
multiple regression discontinuity design approach’, Journal of Public Economics, 109 (2014) 114–
126 
 
Dearden, L., E. Fitzsimons, and G. Wyness (2014). ‘Money for nothing: Estimating the impact of 
student aid on participation in higher education’, Economics of Education Review, Volume 43, 
December 2014, Pages 66–78 
 
DesJardins, S.L., D.A. Ahlburg, and B.P. McCall. (2002). Simulating the Longitudinal Effects of 
Changes in Financial Aid on Student Departure from College. The Journal of Human Resources. 37 
(3):653-679. 
 
DesJardins, S.L., D.A. Ahlburg, and B.P. McCall. (1999). An Event History Model of Student 
Departure. Economics of Education Review. 18: 375-390. 
 
DesJardins, S. L. and B. P. McCall (2010). Simulating the effects of financial aid packages on 
college student stopout, reenrollment spells, and graduation chances. The Review of Higher 
Education 33 (4), 513–541 
Dynarski, S. (2000) ‘Hope for Whom? Financial Aid for the Middle Class and Its Impact on 
College Attendance’, National Tax Journal, 53, 629–61. 
 
Dynarski, S. (2003) ‘Does Aid Matter? Measuring the Effect of Student Aid on College Attendance 
and Completion’, American Economic Review, 93, 279–88. 
 
Garibaldi, P., F. Giavazzi, A. Ichino, and E. Rettore (2012). College cost and time to complete a 
degree: Evidence from tuition discontinuities. Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (3), 699–711. 
 27 
Guryan, J (2004) in Hoxby, C (ed), ‘College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, 
and How to Pay for it, National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report 
 
HEFCE (2013), ‘Non-continuation rates at English HEIs’, Higher Education Funding Council for 
England 
 
Joensen, J. (2013). Timing and Incentives: Impacts of Student Aid on Academic Achievement. 
mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics. 
Kane, T. (1995) ‘Rising Public College Tuition and College Entry: How Well Do Public Subsidies 
Promote Access to College?’, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 
5164. 
 
Nielsen, H.S., T. Sorensen, C. Taber, ‘Estimating the effect of student aid on college enrollment: 
Evidence from a government grant policy reform’, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 
2 (2) (2010), pp. 185–215 
 
OFFA (2015) ‘Access agreements for 2015-16: key statistics and analysis’, Report no 2014/06, 
Office for Fair Access, Bristol 
Oreopoulos, P, D. Lang & J. Angrist, 2009. "Incentives and Services for College Achievement: 
Evidence from a Randomized Trial," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American 
Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 136-63, January. 
 
Seftor, N. & S. Turner, (2002) ‘Back to School: Federal Student Aid Policy and Adult College 
Enrollment’, Journal of Human Resources, 37, 336–52. 
 
Sjoquist and Winters (2012), ‘State Merit-based Financial Aid Programs and College Attainment’, 
IZA DP No. 6801 
 
Scott-Clayton, J (2011), ‘On Money and Motivation: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis of Financial 
Incentives for College Achievement’, Journal of Human Resources Summer 2011 vol. 46 no. 3 
614-646 
 
Tobias, J. (2003). Are Returns to Schooling Concentrated among the Most Able? A Semiparametric 
Analysis of the Ability-Earnings Relationships. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 65(1): 
1-29. 
 
UCAS (2015) ‘End of Cycle 2014 Data Resources; Acceptances by provider country and domicile’, 
University College Admissions System, available at: 
https://www.ucas.com/sites/default/files/eoc_data_resource_2014-dr3_005_01_0.pdf 
 
  
 28 
Figure 1: Average bursary by parental income and university 
 
Notes: Each point represents the mean financial aid received at each university by parental 
income deciles of the estimation sample. Financial aid averaged over all academic years 
and cohorts.  Source administrative data from the 10 universities. 
 
 
Figure 2: Financial Aid Schedules at University X over time 
 
Notes: Figure 2 represents the financial aid schedules for first year students for an anonymous English 
university for students entering in the years 2006 through to 2010. 
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Figure 3: Entry scores by university 
 
Notes: Figure 3 shows box plots of the entry qualification scores of students attending each 
university in the estimation sample. The ends of each box represent the 25th and 75th 
percentiles in entry qualification scores. Source administrative data from the 10 universities. 
 
 
Figure 4: university aid rules and compliance at university 4, 2008 
 
Notes: Figure 4 shows household income and bursary receipt for every first-year student 
within university 4, in 2008. The horizontal and vertical lines show the different bursary 
levels advertised by the university at each income level.   
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Figure 5: Average marginal impact of £1,000 aid on degree performance 
  
Notes: Figure 5 shows the predicted outcome of good degree over the range of bursary 
aid amounts awarded Estimates come from the fixed effects estimators, which can be 
found in Column 6 of Table 2. Standard errors clustered at the university*year*subject 
level. Source administrative data from the 10 universities. 
 
Figure 6: Average marginal impact of £1,000 aid on degree performance, across ability of student 
 
Notes: Figure 8 shows the marginal impact of an additional £1,000 of for the mean 
student at different levels of entry qualification. Estimates obtained from specification 1 
additionally with the entry test scores and finical aid terms interacted. Calculated using 
the margins command. Standard errors clustered at the university*year*subject level. 
Source administrative data from the 10 universities. 
.5
8
.6
.6
2
.6
4
.6
6
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
G
oo
d 
D
eg
re
e
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Aid Awarded (£K)
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
.1
.1
2
Im
pa
ct
 o
f P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
G
oo
d 
D
eg
re
e
60 120 180 240 300 360 420
Entry Qualification Score
95% Confidence Intervals
Average Marginal Impact of £1000 Aid
 31 
 Table 1: Characteristics and student outcomes 
 Mean Std dev. 
Average bursary (£) 712.808 (611.137) 
Bursary aid in year 1 (£) 862.269 (748.792) 
Bursary aid in year 2 (£) 788.614 (749.033) 
Bursary aid in year 3 (£) 780.989 (757.647) 
Male (%) 0.427 (0.495) 
Age on entry 18.626 (0.837) 
White (%) 0.797 (0.402) 
Household income (£) 28,000 (21000) 
Entry test scores 283.637 (79.257) 
Government aid (£) 1814.65 (1188.752) 
   Dropped out year 1 (%) 0.072 (0.258) 
Dropped out year 2 (%) 0.034 (0.182) 
Dropped out year 3 (%) 0.018 (0.133) 
Dropped out year 4 (%) 0.005 (0.072) 
Dropped out year>4 (%) 0.002 (0.044) 
   
Course scores year 1 0 (1) 
Course scores year 2 0 (1) 
Course scores year 3 0 (1) 
   
Completed degree (%) 0.869 (0.338) 
Obtained good degree (% of all students) 0.626 (0.484) 
Obtained good degree (as % of those completing) 0.720 (0.449) 
N 23,093 
 Notes: sample consists of those who have had a bursary at some point during university. Also sample consists only of 
those students whose final outcome can be observed 
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Table 2: Impact of financial aid on probability of obtaining a good degree 
P(Good Degree) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
1st year financial aid 0.025*** 0.102*** 0.076*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.043*** 
awarded (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Panel B 
1st year financial 0.017 0.177*** 0.179*** 0.201*** 0.184*** 0.158*** 
aid (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
1st year financial  0.003 -0.029*** -0.040*** -0.056*** -0.052*** -0.047*** 
aid squared (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Marginal effect  0.022** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.084*** 
at mean (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Parental Income  
 
     
Student Characteristics 
  
    
University Effects 
   
    
Year Effects            
University*Year Effects 
     
 
Notes: All coefficients show marginal effect at mean bursary amount. Good degree defined as being equal to 1 for those 
students obtaining a first class or upper second class degree, and 0 for all other outcomes, including drop out. Sample 
consists only of those students whose final outcome can be observed. Standard errors are in parenthesis, and are 
clustered at institution*year level.* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 3: Impact of financial aid on probability of obtaining a good degree 
P(Good Degree) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
1st year financial aid 0.022*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.101*** 0.084*** 
awarded (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Panel B 
Reduced form – 1st  -0.036*** 0.081*** 0.060*** 0.033*** 0.022** 0.023** 
year financial rules (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 
     
 
IV- 1st year Financial  -0.041*** 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.041*** 0.028** 0.029** 
Aid Awarded (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
Parental Income  
 
     
Student Characteristics 
  
    
University Effects 
   
    
Year Effects            
University*Year Effects 
     
 
Notes: All coefficients show marginal effect at mean bursary amount. Good degree defined as being equal to 1 for those 
students obtaining a first class or upper second class degree, and 0 for all other outcomes, including drop out. Sample 
consists only of those students whose final outcome can be observed. Standard errors are in parenthesis, and are 
clustered at institution*year level.* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Impact of financial aid on probability of completion 
P(Complete) Complete 1st 
year 
Complete 2nd 
year 
Complete 3rd 
year Good degree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A 
1st year financial aid 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.099*** 0.084*** 
awarded (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) 
Panel B 
Reduced form – 1st 0.009 0.012 0.012 0.021** 
year financial rules (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
    IV- 1st year Financial 0.009 0.016** 0.018** 0.023** 
Aid Awarded (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Parental Income     
Student Characteristics     
University*Year Effects     
Notes: Coefficients presented are of marginal effects at mean bursary amount. Sample sizes vary by year as students 
drop out. Sample consists only of those students whose final outcome can be observed. Sample consists only of those 
students whose final outcome can be observed. Standard errors are in parenthesis, and are clustered at institution*year 
level.* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01 
Table 5: Impact of financial aid on course scores 
P(Course Scores) Course scores 1st 
year 
Course scores 2nd 
year 
Course scores 3rd 
year Good degree 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A 
1st year financial aid 0.166*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.084*** 
awarded (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.008) 
Panel B 
Reduced form – 1st 0.046** 0.028 0.037 0.023** 
year financial rules (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.010) 
IV- 1st year Financial 0.055** 0.035 0.045* 0.029** 
Aid Awarded (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.012) 
Parental Income     
Student Characteristics     
University*Year Effects     
Notes: Coefficients presented are of marginal effects at mean bursary amount. Sample sizes vary by year as students 
drop out. Sample consists only of those students whose final outcome can be observed. Sample consists only of those 
students whose final outcome can be observed. Standard errors are in parenthesis, and are clustered at institution*year 
level.* p < 0.1. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6: Robustness Checks 
Financial Aid Awarded IV Financial Aid Rules 
Complete 1st 
Year 
Course Scores 
1st Year 
Good Degree  Complete 1st 
Year 
Course Scores 
1st Year 
Good Degree 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Main Specification 0.099*** 0.166*** 0.090*** 0.009 0.055** 0.028** 
(0.008) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.011) 
     Include Current 
Students 
0.085*** 0.185*** 0.005 0.060** 
(0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.024) 
       Exclude Outlying 
Entry Score 
Universities 
(1, 9, 10) 
0.091*** 0.202*** 0.096*** 0.007 0.053* 0.022* 
(0.006) (0.022) (0.008) (0.011) (0.032) (0.011) 
       Condition on Prior 
Test Scores by 
Income 
0.100*** 0.164*** 0.089*** 0.007 0.037 0.031* 
(0.008) (0.020) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.017) 
Notes: Sample sizes vary by year as students drop out. Sample consists only of those students whose final 
outcome can be observed. Coefficients presented are of marginal effects at mean bursary amount. Outlying 
Universities based on the lack of overlap in prior test scores with other universities. Accounting for test 
scores reflecting different ability by test scores, additionally controls for test scores multiplied by 
log(1/(Income+1)).  Standard errors are in parenthesis, and are clustered at institution level. * p < 0.1. ** p < 
0.05. *** p < 0.01 
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